I study the impact of beating analysts' forecasts and the impact of analysts' forecast dispersion on the pricing of firms' credit default swaps (CDSs). CDS premium is the compensation required by investors for bearing firms' credit default risk. Sell-side analysts collect and combine market, industry and firm information to produce stock recommendations, stock price targets and accounting number forecasts. The information contained in their forecasts may provide additional information to investors to price CDSs. My results show that firms that beat analysts' earnings and revenue forecasts, and firms with less dispersed analysts' earnings and revenue forecasts have on average reduced CDS premia around the earnings announcement date. These effects are stronger for firm that jointly beat the two forecasts and for firms with high risk of default. The effect of beating analysts' earnings (revenue) forecasts is stronger for firms with more (less) earnings quality.
Beating market expectations, analysts' forecasts dispersion and the pricing of credit default swaps
Introduction
I explore the impact of meeting/beating analysts' earnings and revenue forecasts on firms' Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) and the effect of analysts' forecast dispersion on perceptions regarding firm credit default risk. A CDS is the most commonly utilized type of credit derivative in the market. Similar to an insurance contract, a CDS is a bilateral contract of protection between the buyer and seller that provides the buyer protection against credit default risks. Unlike the firm's cost of debt, which is a function of the firm's probability of default, the recovery risk and differences in contractual agreements, CDSs provide a "clean" measure of the value of firm's default risk because it is the compensation required by market participants if they are to bear that specific risk. Moreover, CDS spreads tend to respond more quickly to credit conditions in the short term (Zhu 2006) . 1 As a result, CDSs provide a specific measure that allows one to test the impact of beating analysts'
forecasts and analysts' forecast dispersion on the pricing of firms' probability of default.
Several models have been developed to study the pricing of CDSs. My study relies on hybrid models (Duffie and Lando 2001) that assume that expected future cash flow and thus the probability of default depend partially on firms' future asset value and capital structure. Because these variables are not observable a priori, investors might rely on a firm's periodic accounting information (Das et al. 2009 , Callen et al. 2009 ) and on the 1 Further details about CDS contracts are presented in the next section.
communications of other market participants, such as credit rating agencies (Hull et al. 2004, Daniels and Jensen 2005) and sell-side analysts, to value firms' credit default risk.
Because financial analysts are information intermediaries with a relative advantage in processing and disseminating firm, industry and market information, meeting or exceeding their expectations (in the form of analysts' earnings and revenue forecasts) provides additional information about future firm performance and therefore help investors to price firms' CDSs. In addition, previous literature finds that an increase in investors' expectations about firms' profitability (e.g., firms that beat analysts' earnings and revenues forecasts) results in an increase in the firms' equity value and in a decrease in the firms' probability of default (Black and Scholes, 1973 and Merton, 1974) . As a result, I expect that meeting/beating analysts' expectations has an impact on firms' CDSs.
Several papers have documented the impact of analysts' forecast dispersion on the equity and bond markets (Chen and Subramanyam 2008, Mansi et al. 2010) . 2 The information contained in analysts' forecasts may reduce information asymmetry between the market and the firm, helping investors to price securities. Thus, the information contained in analysts' earnings and revenues forecast dispersion might have an impact on the price of a firm's credit default risk.
Based on a sample of 56,775 observations (480 unique firms) from the Fitch database from 2002 to 2009, my results show that after controlling for structural factors (Merton 1974) , accounting information, credit ratings scores and cumulative abnormal returns, firms that meet/beat analysts' quarterly earnings and/or revenues forecasts show, on average, a reduction in their CDS premia around the earnings announcement date. I find that the effects of exceeding analysts' forecasts on firms' CDS premia are stronger for firms with a high risk of default and for firms that jointly beat analysts' earnings and revenue forecasts. In addition, beating analysts' quarterly earnings (revenues) forecasts has an impact on CDS premia only for firms with high (low) levels of earnings quality and for firms reporting profits (losses). I also find that the effect of beating analysts' forecasts on the CDS Premium is stronger during the financial crisis period.
I also document a significant association between analysts' forecast dispersion and the pricing of CDSs. Specifically, firms with less dispersed analyst earnings and revenues forecasts tend to present a reduction in their CDS premia around the earnings announcement date. My results indicate that less uncertainty about firms' future performance, as proxied by the dispersion in analysts' forecasts, are priced into firms' credit default risk.
In recent years, CDSs have dramatically increased in popularity, rising from $180 billion in 1996 to over $54.6 trillion in the second quarter of 2008. 3 This amount represents over two times the size of the U.S. stock market according to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). The rapid development and lax regulation of the CDS market have been implicated as some of the causes behind the recent financial crisis, raising a number of policy concerns about market stability. Given the amount of resources allocated in the economy in the form of CDSs and the composition of most investor portfolios, studying the determinants of CDS pricing has become an important task in recent years. Moreover, previous literature has studied the impact of sell-side analysts'
forecasts on the equity and bond market. My paper attempts to provide evidence on the impact of the information provided by this important group of market participants on 3 http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDA-Market-Survey-historical-data.pdf perceptions regarding firms' credit default risk and on how earnings quality affects the impact of beating market expectations.
Previous studies document that a firm's cost of debt responds to beating analysts' earnings forecasts and to the amount of dispersion in those forecasts (Jiang 2008 , Mansi et al. 2010 . My paper extends this literature in two important ways. First, by focusing on CDS pricing rather than on the cost of debt of firms, I am able to isolate the impact of beating analysts' forecasts on the market's perception of a firm's probability of default. The reason for this analysis is that a firm's cost of debt prices not only the firm's probability of default but also the debtholders' recovery risk. 4 Second, I provide evidence that beating analysts' forecasts (earnings and revenue forecasts) and not only earnings forecasts are associated with declines in the market's perception of a firm's probability of default.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes some characteristics of CDS contracts. This section also reviews the literature about the impact of analysts' forecasts on the equity and debt market, the models developed to estimate the price of CDSs and the impact of accounting information on the CDS market. In this section, I develop the main hypothesis. Section 3 presents the research design and the sample selection procedure.
Section 4 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficients among the main 4 The importance of being able to isolate the effect on the market's perception of a firm's default risk is most easily seen by trying to control for the debtholders' recovery risk when examining the impact of exceeding analysts' forecasts on the firm's cost of debt. To perform this analysis, I compute the ratio of the firm's total debt to property, plant and equipment each year and use it as a proxy for recovery risk-those with small (large) values are those with lower (higher) levels of recovery risk. Replacing the log of the firm's CDS price at the end of the quarter with the log of the firm's initial bond yield at the end of the quarter as the independent variable and running the regressions separately for those firms in the top and bottom terciles as ranked by the ratio of total debt to PPE provide evidence of the value of isolating default risk from recovery risk. In particular, beating analysts' forecasts is not associated with a firm's cost of debt when the firm's recovery risk is high. Furthermore, while the association between analysts' forecasts and a firm's cost of debt is similar to their association to the price of CDS on the firm's debt, the relation is significantly weaker. Because the ratio of total debt to PPE is merely a proxy for recovery risk, these results show the value of focusing specifically on a pure measure of the market's pricing of the firm's default risk.
variables used in this study. Section 5 presents the multivariate analysis and describes the main results. Section 6 shows some additional analysis and section 7 concludes the paper.
Literature Review and Hypotheses development

Credit Default Swaps
Credit default swaps (CDSs) are financial instruments that serve to protect against a default on a particular bond or security. CDSs are a bilateral contract between the buyer and the seller of protection where the buyer of a CDS, who is not required to but often owns the underlying credit asset, pays a periodic, quarterly or annual, fee or premium to the seller.
The CDS spreads are the annualized premium rate quoted as a percentage of the notional value of the underlying debt. The seller agrees to pay the buyer a set amount if there is a credit event, such as bankruptcy, failure to pay, and restructuring. Once the specified creditrelated event, such as the insolvency of an underlying corporate entity, occurs, a 'Credit Event Notice' is delivered either by the buyer or seller. Usually, the settlement conditions for the default payments of CDS are established at the time of writing the relevant CDS contract. These conditions typically take the form of physical or cash settlements. If a physical settlement is agreed upon, the protection buyer has to deliver the underlying bond in exchange for compensation. If a cash settlement is agreed upon, the protection buyer receives the difference between the bond value at the time of settlement and the bond's nominal value in cash. CDS contracts are usually traded in maturities from 6 months to 30 years.
In contrast to other types of derivatives, such as interest rate swaps, but similar to options, the risks assumed in a CDS by the protection buyer and protection seller are not symmetrical. The protection buyer effectively takes on a short position in the credit risk of the reference entity, which thereby relieves the buyer from exposure to default. The protection seller, in contrast, takes on a long position in the credit risk of the reference entity, which is essentially the same as the default risk taken on when lending directly to the reference entity.
The motivation for this paper comes from two sources within the literature: i) the impact of beating/meeting analysts' expectations on investors' perceptions about firm performance and the effect of analysts' forecasts on capital markets and ii) the impact of accounting information on perceptions regarding firms' credit default risk.
2.2 The effects of beating analysts' forecasts and the properties of analysts' forecasts for capital markets
Previous literature provides evidence that investors, boards of directors, and creditors use analysts' forecasts as points of reference in evaluating firms' future performance. Accordingly, meeting/beating analysts' earnings and revenue forecasts have an important impact on firm stock prices and on the cost of debt (Bartov et al. 2005 , Brown and Caylor 2005 , Rees and Sivaramakrishnan 2007 , Ertimur et al. 2003 , Ertimur et al. 2009 ).
Providing evidence of the impact of meeting analysts' earnings forecasts on equity returns, Brown and Caylor (2005) and Bartov et al. (2005) find that after controlling for earnings forecast errors, firms that beat current analysts' earnings expectations enjoy a higher return than firms that fail to meet such expectations. These authors also find that avoiding negative quarterly earnings surprises has become the most important reference point in recent years and has become more important than meeting zero earnings or earnings numbers for previous years. Because earnings are the most important metric used to evaluate firms' future performance (Graham et al. 2005) , firms that beat analysts' earnings forecasts may provide useful information that helps to determine firm credit default risk.
The literature also provides evidence on the value relevance of analysts' revenues forecasts. Rees and Sivaramakrishnan (2007) find that the revenue response coefficient is statistically significant after controlling for the magnitude of the earnings surprise. These researchers conclude that revenues provide incremental information to the market about firm value. Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006) investors' expectations about future firms' value results in the perceived probability of default, I expect a decrease in the premium that firms pay for credit risk protection for firms that beat analysts' expectations. On the other hand, since the major players in the credit market are institutional investors, if analysts' forecasts contain little information about firm probability of default, the credit markets would ignore them. In addition, managers face incentives to meet analysts' forecasts; if this is the case meeting these forecasts would not provide relevant information to price credit default swaps.
7 Because their main analysis focuses on the effect of accounting numbers on CDS prices, Callen et al. (2009) measure the level of CDS premium as the log of the CDS premium one day after the SEC filing date and compute the change in the CDS premium from one day after the quarter t SEC filing date to one day after the quarter t+1 SEC filing date.
Hypothesis 1. Firms that meet or beat analysts' earnings or revenue expectations have, on average, a reduction in their CDS premia around the earnings announcement date.
The role of accounting information is particularly important at shorter maturities (Duffie and Lando (2001)). Consequently, I expect the impact of meeting/beating analysts'
forecasts be more pronounced at shorter maturities.
As argued by Mansi et al. (2010) , the information contained in analysts' forecasts (especially forecast dispersion) impacts perceptions regarding firms' future performance.
These authors find that less forecast dispersion and less revision volatility are negatively related to firms' cost of debt. If analysts disagree about the future accounting information of a firm to a lesser degree, there will likely be less uncertainty about the firm's future performance, and therefore, a reduced premium may need to be paid for default risk protection.
Hypothesis 2. Firms for which analysts' earnings and revenue forecasts have less dispersion have, on average, lower CDS premia around the earnings announcement date.
If earnings surprises are accompanied by revenue surprises in the same direction, the earnings surprises are likely to be driven by revenue growth rather than by a reduction in expenses (or by increases in net margins). This situation might provide useful information about a firm's future ability to grow and therefore reduce the firm's perceived probability of a default.
Hypothesis 3. Firms that jointly beat analysts' earnings and revenue forecasts have a stronger impact on the pricing of CDSs.
When earnings are more informative about firms' performance, investors may place a greater emphasis on earnings information. Therefore, I hypothesize that the effect of beating analysts' earnings forecasts on the pricing of firms' credit default risk is more pronounced for firms with more earnings quality.
Hypothesis 4. The effect of beating analysts' earnings expectations compared to the effect of beating analysts' revenue forecasts on the pricing of CDS premia is more pronounced for firms with higher earnings quality.
Previous studies indicate that there is a stronger effect of earnings benchmark beating for high default risk firms (Jiang, 2008, DeFond and Zhang, 2008) . As a result, meeting earnings and revenues forecasts is likely more important when there is a high risk of insolvency.
Hypothesis 5. The effect of beating analysts' earnings and revenue forecasts on the pricing of CDS premia is more pronounced for firms with high default risk.
Research Design
Following previous studies, I use a regression approach to model the determinants of CDS prices (e.g., Abid and Naifar 2006 and Callen et al. 2009 The dependent variable is the change of the CDS premium from one day before to one day after the quarterly earnings announcement date. To test my first hypothesis, I
include the following independent variables: i) BeatEarn i,t , which takes the value of 1 if the firm meets or beats the analysts' quarterly earnings forecast consensus in quarter t and 0 otherwise; and ii) BeatRev i,t , which is set equal to 1 if the firm meets or beats the analysts' quarterly revenue forecast consensus in quarter t and 0 otherwise. 10 My first hypothesis predicts that the coefficients of these two variables will be negative and statistically significant. To test my second hypothesis, I include the dispersion of analysts' forecasts in the model. I define the dispersion of analysts' earnings and revenue forecasts as the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts' earnings and revenues forecasts, respectively, which are issued for the quarter t:
I expect that the coefficients of analysts' forecast dispersions (β 13 , β 14 , and β 15 ) will be negative and significant.
Following the structural models of CDS valuation, I include in the model firm leverage (Lev), measured as the firm's long-term debt divided by total assets at the end of the quarter t, the one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter (Yield), and the standard control for the Standard & Poor's short-term credit rating (Hull et al. 2004 ) of the underlying firm. I translate rating letters into numbers, with smaller numbers indicating better ratings. 12 I include year dummy variables to control for time effects. I also estimate 11 The difference between liquid and semi-liquid CDSs is in the method used to capture the premium data. The premia for liquid CDSs are based directly on market maker prices. The premia for semi-liquid CDSs are based on benchmark prices derived by comparing similar entities. 12 Trying to control for some nonlinearities in the association between variables, I also estimate the coefficients of the model using rank variables instead of continuous variables. I assign all of the continuous variables to one of ten deciles based on the sample distribution each year. 
where AT it = Firm i's average total assets in quarter t and quarter t-1;
TCA it = Firm i's total current accruals in quarter t. I measure total accruals as firm's i change in current asset in quarter t and quarter t-1, minus firm's i change in current liabilities in quarter t and quarter t-1, less the firm's i change in cash in quarter t and quarter t-1, plus firm's i change in debt in current liabilities in quarter t and quarter t-1; and CFO it = Firm i's net income before extraordinary items minus total accruals in quarter t.
14 I estimate equation (1) for each firm over rolling twelve-quarter windows. Using the regression coefficients, I estimate twelve firm-and quarter-specific residuals. I define accrual quality as the negative of the standard deviation of the firm-quarter estimated residuals:
Accrual Quality it = -SD (ε j time ) time = t-12, t-8,…, t
Larger values of Accrual Quality it correspond to firms with higher accrual quality.
15 13 The results are robust for other models develop in the literature to measure earnings quality such as Francis et al (2005) . 14 I measure total accruals as the Total current accruals (TCA) less depreciation. 15 An observation is classified in the high earnings quality group if the standard deviation of the residuals is above the median values of the distribution each year.
To test whether the effect of meeting analysts' forecasts is more pronounced for firms with a high risk of default, I run models 1 and 3 again for two subsamples of firmquarter observations based on their S&P credit rating. Specifically, I classify a firm-quarter observation in the "high risk of default" group if it has a credit rating of BBB-or lower at the end of the quarter. I expect that the effect of beating analysts' forecasts will be stronger for this subsample of firms. Table 1 shows the distribution of the observations by credit rating category and the mean and median CDS premium for all of the observations in each category. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with a smaller number indicating a better rating. As expected, the mean (median) CDS premium decreases monotonically from more than 1,233.1
Descriptive Statistics
(1,172.2) basis points for firms with CCC+ credit ratings to 22.5 (21) basis points for firms with AAA+ credit ratings. Almost half of the observations correspond to contracts for firms with credit ratings of BBB+, BBB, BBB-and BB+.
[Insert Table 1 around here] Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables in my analysis.
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The mean (median) CDS premium change around the earnings announcement date in the sample is 0.002 (-0.002), and the mean firm size is US$ 11,872 million. Table 2 shows that 62.6% and 61.9% of the observations beat analysts' annual earnings and revenue forecasts, respectively. The mean forecast errors are -0.008 and 0.003 for analyst earnings and revenue forecasts, respectively. Almost 42% of the observations beat the two forecasts, and 17.4% of the observations miss earnings and revenues forecasts. The average maturity is 7.52 years, and almost 40% of the observations correspond to semi-liquid contracts.
[Insert Table 2 around here] [Insert Table 3 around here]
Results
To test whether meeting/beating analysts' earnings and revenues forecasts and the dispersion of those forecasts have an impact on firms' CDS premia, I estimate the coefficients of Equation 1 and present the results in Table 4 . The first column presents the results for the full sample, the second, third and fourth columns presents the results for CDS contracts at short, medium and long term maturities, respectively The variable that measures the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with theories about the association between equity returns and firms' probability of default previously documented in the literature (Black and Scholes, 1973 and Merton 1974 ). The variable denoting observations that beat analysts' earnings (BeatEarn) or revenue (BeatRev) forecasts is negative and significant (-0.0033, p-value <0.0011, and -0.001, p-value<0.10, respectively). Moreover, the coefficients of analyst earnings and revenues forecasts dispersion (DispersionEarn and DispersionRev) are negative and statistically significant in each model (-0.0054, p-value<0.001 and -0.022, p-value<0.001 ).
These results are also economically significant; for example, a decrease of one standard deviation in analysts' revenues forecast dispersion leads to a reduction on average of about 7.4 basis points in CDS premia. In addition, the forecast surprise coefficients (EpsSurp and RevSurp) are also statistically significant. These results support the first two hypotheses: firms that exceed analysts' forecasts and firms with lower levels of analysts' forecast dispersion enjoy smaller CDS premia when earnings are announced. 18 In addition, the effect of beating analysts' forecasts is stronger at shot maturities. The coefficients of the variable indicating firms that beet or meet analysts' earnings forecasts for CDS at short maturities is almost the double than CDS with maturities more than 5 years (0.0025 vs.
0.0050).
[Insert Table 4 around here]
The results of the joint impact of beating analysts' earnings and revenues forecasts on CDS premia are shown in Table 5 . The first column presents the results for the full sample, the second, third and fourth columns presents the results for CDS contracts at short term, medium term and long term maturities, respectively. Considering all the observations, the dummy variable denoting observations that beat both analysts' earnings and revenue forecasts (BeatEarn_BeatRev) is negative and significant (-0.0023, p-value<0.001), meaning that firms that beat both analysts' forecasts enjoy, on average, lower CDS premia when firms announce their earnings numbers. However, the dummy variable denoting observations that miss analysts' earnings and that beat revenue forecasts (MissEarn_BeatRev) is positive and significant (0.0022, p-value<0.05). Investors value more earnings signals when they assess the impact of beating analysts' forecasts on the firms' credit default risk. In addition, the effect of beating both analyst' forecasts is stronger at short maturities.
18 Using rank variables, I find that the estimated coefficients of Rank_EarnSurp and Rank_RevSurp are negative and statistically significant. Also, I find that the coefficients of Rank_DispersionEarn and Rank_ DispersionRev are negative and statistically significant.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
In this study, I test whether the effect of beatings analysts' quarterly earnings (revenues) forecasts on a firm's CDS is stronger for firms with higher (lower) earnings quality. Table 6 presents the results. As predicted, the coefficient of the dummy variable denoting firms that beat analysts' earnings forecasts (BeatEarn) is negative and statistically significant for only the subset of observations with high accrual quality (-0.0036, pvalue<0.001). However, the dummy variables denoting firms that beat revenues forecasts (BeatRev) is negative and statistically significant for only the subsample of firms with low accrual quality (-0.0047, p-value<0.001). In addition, the accounting variables leverage (Lev) and firms' size (Size) have a larger impact on firms' CDS when earnings map more precisely the firms' cash flow. Table 7 presents the effect of beating analysts' earnings and revenues for firms with high and low accrual quality. Firms with low (high) earnings quality that miss earnings and that beat revenues forecasts have a negative (positive) coefficient. The results show that beating earnings (revenues) analysts' forecasts has a stronger (weaker) impact on the pricing of CDS for firms with high (low) accrual quality.
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 around here]
To test whether there is a stronger effect of earnings benchmark beating for high default risk firms (Jiang, 2008, DeFond and Zhang, 2008) , I estimate models 1 and 3 for two subsamples of firms, with one presenting high default risk and one presenting low default risk. [Insert Tables 8 and 9 around here]
Overall, the results of this paper show that analysts provide important information that help investors to price firms' credit default risk. Analysts' earnings and revenues forecast dispersion and exceeding analysts' earnings and revenue forecasts have an impact on the pricing of firms' CDS premia around the earnings announcement date.
Additional analysis
Firms reporting losses vs. firms reporting profits
Losses are less informative about firms' future prospects (Hayn 2005 ).
Consequently, investors probably find revenues more informative when they assess the impact of accounting information in the valuation of CDS for firms reporting losses during the quarter. To test this idea, I estimate the coefficients of model 1 for two subsamples of firms based on the sign of earnings: firms reporting profits and firms reporting losses. CDS during the financial crisis.
[Insert Table 11 around here]
Conclusions
Previous literature has examined the impact of sell-side analysts on the equity and debt market. This paper has attempted to determine the impact of the information provided by these important market participants on investors' perceptions of firms' credit default risk. Credit default swaps (CDSs) are credit derivatives that provide a clean measure of firms' credit default risk and thus allow one to test the impact of analysts' forecast dispersion and the effect of beating analysts' earnings and revenues forecasts on the pricing of this particular type of risk. My results indicate that firms with less dispersed quarterly analysts' earnings and revenues forecasts show lower CDS premia around the earnings announcement date. Moreover, firms that beat analysts' earnings and revenue forecasts experience a decrease in the price that they must pay for credit default risk protection when preliminary earnings are announced. All of these effects are stronger for firms with high risk of default. The evidence in this study indicates that analyst communications, specifically analysts' forecasts, play an important role in the pricing of firms' credit default risk. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the following variables: CDS_change it = the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the earnings announcement day. Lev it = firm i's long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Size it = log of firm i's total assets at the end of quarter t. StdRet it = firm i's standard deviation of daily returns during quarter t. SP it = Standard & Poor's debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller number indicating better rating. Yield t = one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CAR it = Cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurp it = earnings surprise, computed as firm i's actual earnings per share values from IBES minus the analysts' forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. RevSurp it = revenues surprise, computed as firm i's actual revenues per share values from IBES minus the analysts' forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarn it = 1 if firm i meets or beats the analysts' earnings forecast consensus in quarter t. BeatRev it = 1 if firm i meets or beat the analysts' revenues forecast consensus in quarter t. BeatEarn_BeatRev = 1 if firm i meets or beats analysts' earnings and revenues forecast consensus in quarter t. MissEarn_MissRev = 1 if firm i misses analysts' earnings and revenues forecast consensus in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts' forecasts issued for firm i in quarter t. Mat it = Maturity of the cds protection. Senior it = 1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liq it = 1 for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts. Table 3 Pearson Correlation Coefficients Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients. Variable definitions are as follows: CDS_change it = the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the earnings announcement day. Lev it = firm i's long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Size it = log of firm i's total assets at the end of quarter t. StdRet it = firm i's standard deviation of daily returns during quarter t. SP it = Standard & Poor's debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller number indicating better rating. Yield t = one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CAR it = Cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings announcement day of quarter t. BeatEarn it = 1 if firm i meets or beats the analysts' earnings forecast consensus in quarter t. BeatRev it = 1 if firm i meets or beats the analysts' revenues forecast consensus in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts' forecasts issued for firm i in quarter t. Mat it = Maturity of the cds protection. Senior it = 1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liq it = 1 for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts. The coefficients in bold are statistically significant at least at p<0.05. Where: CDS_change it = the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the earnings announcement day. Lev it = firm i's long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Size it = log of firm i's total assets at the end of quarter t. StdRet it = firm i's standard deviation of daily returns during quarter t. SP it = Standard & Poor's debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller number indicating better rating. Yield t = one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CAR it = Cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurp it = earnings surprise, computed as firm i's actual earnings per share values from IBES minus the analysts' forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. RevSurp it = revenues surprise, computed as firm i's actual revenues per share values from IBES minus the analysts' forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarn it = 1 if firm i meets or beats the analysts' earnings forecast consensus in quarter t. BeatRev it = 1 if firm i meets or beat the analysts' revenues forecast consensus in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts' forecasts issued for firm i in quarter t. Mat it = Maturity of the cds protection. Senior it = 1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liq it = 1 for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts.
Q1
CDS_change Lev
Full sample Mat less than a year
Mat between 1 and 5 years Mat more than 5 years ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; p-values are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. CDS_change it = the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the earnings announcement day. Lev it = firm i's long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Size it = log of firm i's total assets at the end of quarter t StdRet it = firm i's standard deviation of daily returns during quarter t. SP it = Standard & Poor's debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller number indicating better rating. Yield t = one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CAR it = Cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurp it = earnings surprise, computed as firm i's actual earnings per share values from IBES minus the analysts' forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. RevSurp it = revenues surprise, computed as firm i's actual revenues per share values from IBES minus the analysts' forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarn_BeatRev = 1 if firm i meets or beats analysts' earnings and revenues forecasts in quarter t. MissEarn_MissRev = 1 if firm i misses analysts' earnings and revenues forecasts in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts' forecasts issued for firm i in quarter t. Mat it = Maturity of the cds protection. Senior it = 1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liq it = 1 for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts.
Table 5 Regression Results of the Joint Effect of Beating Analysts' Earnings and Revenues Forecasts on the CDS Premium around the Earnings Announcement Date
Full sample Mat less than a year
Mat between 1 and 5 years Where: CDS_change it = the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the earnings announcement day. Lev it = firm i's long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Size it = log of firm i's total assets at the end of quarter t. StdRet it = standard deviation of daily returns during firm i's quarter t. SP it = Standard & Poor's debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller number indicating better rating. Yield t = one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CAR it = Cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurp it = earnings surprise, computed as firm i's actual earnings per share values from IBES minus the analysts' forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. RevSurp it = revenues surprise, computed as firm i's actual revenues per share values from IBES minus the analysts' forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarn it = 1 if firm i meets or beats the analysts' earnings forecast consensus in quarter t. BeatRev it = 1 if firm i meets or beat the analysts' revenues forecast consensus in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts' forecasts issued for firm i in quarter t. Mat it = Maturity of the cds protection. Senior it = 1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liq it = 1 for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts. CDS_change it = the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the earnings announcement day. Lev it = firm i's long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Size it = log of firm i's total assets at the end of quarter t. CDS_change it = the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the earnings announcement day. Lev it = firm i's long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Size it = log of firm i's total assets at the end of quarter t. Where: CDS_change it = the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the earnings announcement day. Lev it = firm i's long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Size it = log of firm i's total assets at the end of quarter t. StdRet it = firm i's standard deviation of daily returns during quarter t. SP it = Standard & Poor's debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller number indicating better rating. Yield t = one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CAR it = Cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurp it = earnings surprise, computed as firm i's actual earnings per share values from IBES minus the analysts' forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. RevSurp it = revenues surprise, computed as firm i's actual revenues per share values from IBES minus the analysts' forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarn it = 1 if firm i meets or beats the analysts' earnings forecast consensus in quarter t. BeatRev it = 1 if firm i meets or beat the analysts' revenues forecast consensus in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts' forecasts issued for firm i in quarter t. Mat it = Maturity of the cds protection. Senior it = 1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liq it = 1 for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts. Where: CDS_change it = the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the earnings announcement day. Lev it = firm i's long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Size it = log of firm i's total assets at the end of quarter t. StdRet it = firm i's standard deviation of daily returns during quarter t. SP it = Standard & Poor's debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller number indicating better rating. Yield t = one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CAR it = Cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurp it = earnings surprise, computed as firm i's actual earnings per share values from IBES minus the analysts' forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. RevSurp it = revenues surprise, computed as firm i's actual revenues per share values from IBES minus the analysts' forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarn it = 1 if firm i meets or beats the analysts' earnings forecast consensus in quarter t. BeatRev it = 1 if firm i meets or beat the analysts' revenues forecast consensus in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts' forecasts issued for firm i in quarter t. Mat it = Maturity of the cds protection. Senior it = 1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liq it = 1 for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts. 
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